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Media malaise or mobilization: How do mass media affect
electoral participation in established democracies
Abstract
In modern democracies, elections are considered the central mechanism for people to control their
elected representatives. They allow voters who are dissatisfied with those in power to periodically
punish and replace them. However, this requires that political decision-making is transparent and that
alternative party options are actually evident in the electoral contest. Accordingly, in line with
mobilization theory, we assume that well-balanced and critical media coverage leads to a higher turnout.
So far, only few studies exist which test these assumptions in a large comparative setting. To provide
more empirical evidence on the relationship between media coverage and political participation, we
combine data about press systems and from newspaper content analyses with opinion surveys and
perform multi-level analyses. Contrary to our assumptions, we find that an ideological balance within
the press system does not motivate citizens to take part in elections. In addition, newspapers reports
about official misconduct tend to keep voters away from the ballot boxes. These findings rather lend
support to media malaise theory.
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Abstract 
In modern democracies, elections are considered the central mechanism for people to control their 
elected representatives. They allow voters who are dissatisfied with those in power to periodically 
punish and replace them. However, this requires that political decision-making is transparent and 
that alternative party options are actually evident in the electoral contest. Accordingly, in line with 
mobilization theory, we assume that well-balanced and critical media coverage leads to a higher 
turnout. So far, only few studies exist which test these assumptions in a large comparative setting. 
To provide more empirical evidence on the relationship between media coverage and political 
participation, we combine data about press systems and from newspaper content analyses with 
opinion surveys and perform multi-level analyses. Contrary to our assumptions, we find that an 
ideological balance within the press system does not motivate citizens to take part in elections. In 
addition, newspapers reports about official misconduct tend to keep voters away from the ballot 
boxes. These findings rather lend support to media malaise theory. 
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1 Introduction 
Elections are still a key feature of modern representative democracies. Regular elections serve to 
determine the composition of the government and force political representatives to consider the 
wishes of the citizens in their policy-making (Teorell 2006). This fosters the responsiveness of the 
political system, but only if those who do express their preferences at the polls are representative for 
the population at large (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Teorell, Sum and Tobiasen 2006). Yet, 
voting is costly, and as turnout statistics show worldwide, participation levels in elections tend to be 
decreasing since the 1960s (Lijphart 1997).1 According to Lijphart (1997), low turnout goes at the 
expense of equal participation. Hence, the fewer people vote in elections, the more certain societal 
groups are overrepresented in the voting population. 
In this contribution, we argue that media can provide useful incentives to vote. Mass media play an 
increasingly crucial role in contemporary democracies since they are the main source of information 
for the vast majority of the electorate. Following normative democratic theory, media basically have 
two functions for democracy in general and for electoral participation in particular. On the one 
hand, mass media should serve as a forum for the public discourse among all members of the 
society. On the other hand, they need to guarantee the flow of information between governors and 
the governed.  
The aim of this paper is to test how the performance of these two functions by the press affects the 
willingness of individuals to choose parties and participate in elections. Our analyses are based on 
multi-level analyses of a large range of countries. In order to test our assumptions, we rely on 
various data sources. The individual-level data is taken from large-scale international surveys. The 
indicators that capture democratic performance of the press focus, on the one hand on information 
about a country’s press system. On the other hand, we work with a new dataset which is based on a 
comprehensive computer-assisted content analysis. 
The paper is structured as follows: chapter 2 and 3 outline the theoretical and empirical literature on 
the subject and derives our central expectations. Chapter 4 discusses the design of our study as well 
as the data and methods used. The results of our analyses are presented in chapter 5. Chapter 6 
summarizes our findings and concludes. 
2 The importance of electoral turnout for democracy 
The involvement of the people in shaping political decisions is the key characteristic of democratic 
regimes. According to the notion which is probably most widespread and which Teorell (2006) calls 
                                                
1 This is of course also due to the prevalence of new forms of political participation. 
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'responsive democracy', participation serves to influence both the composition and the decisions of 
governments, in order to ensure the equal consideration of all citizens' preferences and needs in the 
political process of representative democracies (Teorell 2006: 789). From this perspective, elections 
can be considered the central form of participation in representative democracies. Not only do they 
directly determine the composition of governing bodies, they are also supposed to affect the policies 
pursued by political representatives. Thereby, elections are important for the responsiveness, 
vertical accountability and ultimately the legitimacy of democratic regimes (Anderson 2007; Dahl 
1971; Powell 2004; Bühlmann and Kriesi 2007; Bühlmann, Merkel and Wessels 2008). However, 
elections only contribute to the "chain of responsiveness" (Powell 2004) if 1) voters choose from a 
range of electoral alternatives those candidates or parties which best endorse their preferences and 
2) if voters hold incumbents accountable for their past actions, i.e. if they elect those representatives 
out of office whose performance has not been satisfying (Powell 2004; Ramsden 1996: 74f.).  
Additionally and even more fundamentally, if the interests of all citizens are to be represented in the 
decision making process, participation needs to be equal. In other words, the preferences and needs 
of the voting population should be representative of the preferences and needs of the whole 
electorate (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Teorell 2006; Teorell, Sum and Tobiasen 2006). 
This implies that as many people as possible should actually express their preferences by casting a 
vote, because – as common sense suggests and as research has shown – the higher turnout levels 
are, the more equal participation is (Bühlmann and Kriesi 2007; Lijphart 1997; Teorell, Sum and 
Tobiasen 2006). Thus, the more citizens are mobilized to go to the polls, the lower the likelihood 
that certain social groups are systematically excluded from the political process. 
This raises the question of which individual characteristics determine whether citizens take part in 
elections or not. The literature on this subject is of course abundant. Following Teorell (2006), there 
are two main causes of participation. First, several resources affect people’s capacity to vote. This 
includes physical capital, such as income, wealth and spare time (Norris 2000), social capital in the 
form of social networks (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993) and finally human capital, which comprises 
education as well as "political sophistication" (Luskin 1987). Sophistication requires skills and 
knowledge, such as for example the citizens' perception of their political comprehension (internal 
efficacy), their ability to evaluate government performance, or to place parties and themselves onto 
the left-right scale (Luskin 1987; Bühlmann and Kriesi 2007; Teorell 2006; Teorell, Sum and 
Tobiasen 2006). The second cause of participation is the people’s motivation to vote. Important 
factors to capture motivation are an individual’s general interest in politics, media news 
consumption, party identification, satisfaction with life or the way democracy works or norms, such 
as a perceived civic voting duty (Norris 2000; Teorell, Sum and Tobiasen 2006). 
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But participation levels do not only differ between individuals, they also vary across the different 
environments in which individuals live (Blais 2006; Bühlmann 2006). Franklin even states that 
"turnout varies much more from country to country than it does between different types of 
individuals" (Franklin 1996: 217f.). According to Lijphart, this suggests "that in order to expand 
voting in a country with low turnout it is much more promising to improve the institutional context 
than to raise levels of education and political interest" (Lijphart 1997: 7). This paper focuses on the 
impact of one specific feature of the institutional context: mass media, and more specifically the 
press. The next chapter discusses how mass media can influence electoral participation as well as an 
individual's resources and motivation to vote. 
3 The role of the media for participation 
Chan emphasizes that a modern democracy is by definition a mediated democracy, with the media 
serving as a means of expression and as a means of information (Chan 2001: 115). In this quote, the 
two core normative functions of the media for democracy become obvious. First, media should 
guarantee a public forum or a “marketplace of ideas” (Napoli 1999) where all social groups can 
express and exchange their interests and demands (Beierwaltes 2000; Graber 2003; Norris 2000; 
Rautenfeld 2005; Woods 2007). Second, media should provide all citizens with information about 
politics, public affairs and the activities of the political elites (Beierwaltes 2000; Graber 2003; 
Lippman 1923; Norris 2000).  
These functions become especially relevant during election campaigns. Because of the progressing 
dealignment of voters from clear ideological ties since the 1960s, political parties lost their stable 
constituencies (Dalton 1984; Dalton, Beck and Flanagan 1984). Accordingly, today the 
communication of political affairs primarily takes place via the mass media (Bennett and Entman 
2001; Froehlich 2001: 21; Glynn et al. 1999; McAllister 2002; Ramsden 1996). “The vast majority 
of an electorate only hears about politics and election campaigns through the media and the content 
forms the backdrop against which political leaders, institutions, and issues are evaluated” (Vreese 
and Semetko 2004: 14). 
For all these reasons, media2 are assumed to be important mobilizing agents who can propel citizens 
to go to the polls. The central role that media play in electoral contests is largely undebated 
(Schmitt-Beck and Farrell 2002; Vreese and Semetko 2004). Vreese and Semetko even argue that 
“given the centrality of media in campaigns, common sense suggests that the media are bound to 
have effects on the electorate” (Vreese and Semetko 2004: 14). Yet, despite a large number of 
                                                
2 Especially newspapers and television, which are usually cited as the main sources of information by citizens all over 
the world (Vreese and Semetko 2004). 
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studies, the existence and nature of these effects are still not very clear (Schmitt-Beck and Farrell 
2002). So far, political science and communication research has struggled to provide solid empirical 
evidence of the media’s impact on electoral participation. The effects found in quantitative studies 
are often weak or inconclusive on the one hand, or mixed and contradictory on the other hand. 
There are various methodological reasons for this empirical weakness. But most importantly, there 
is a fundamental lack of cross-country comparative studies. Most research focuses on the United 
States and maybe a few additional countries (Gulati, Just and Crigler 2004: 251; Schmitt-Beck and 
Farrell 2002: 2). However, since media systems and cultures vary greatly across countries (Hallin 
and Mancini 2004), so might their influence on recipients. Thus, the larger context in which media 
take place should be taken into account. For this reason, this contribution provides an analysis of 
media effects across a wide range of countries.  
On top of the question whether media influence voters or not, the literature is also very 
controversial regarding how media coverage actually affects voters and especially their propensity 
to vote. Most commonly, mass media have been accused of not living up to the normative 
expectations imposed on them. According to “video- or media malaise” theory (Newton 1999; 
Norris 2000), political news is not only increasingly rare but also focuses more and more on 
personalization, scandals and sensational events as well as the conflict and competition between 
political actors instead of substantive political issues (Gerhards 1994; Gulati, Just and Crigler 2004; 
Gunther and Mughan 2000; Habermas 2006; Imhof 2002; Iyengar 1991; Jarren 1998; Patterson 
1998; Rhee 1997). This development, in turn, is supposed to lead to civic disengagement, mistrust 
and a crisis of political legitimacy (Glynn et al. 1999: 441; Gunther and Mughan 2000: 427; 
Kleinnijenhuis, Hoof and Oegema 2006; Vreese and Semetko 2004: 16).  
Adherents of the mobilization theory, by contrast, rely more often on cross-country comparisons. 
Pointing to the rising cognitive mobilization of the population (Dalton 1996; Inglehart 1990), they 
conclude that the amount of substantive news in the media is generally satisfying and does actually 
foster or at least not inhibit the citizens’ participation, knowledge and trust (Graber 2004). 
Accordingly, Norris (2000) finds that attention to newspapers and TV news has a positive impact on 
turnout in EU elections. In a similar vein, Newton (1999) lends support to the mobilization theory 
by showing that reading broadsheet newspapers or watching TV news in the United Kingdom leads 
to more knowledge, interest and confidence regarding politics. At the same time, paying attention to 
tabloid newspapers or general television content has almost no effects on either mobilization or 
media malaise (Newton 1999: 591f.). 
In this contribution, we pick up the two central functions of media in a democracy. On the one 
hand, we argue that media have to guarantee a good balance of different political forces in the 
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public sphere. On the other hand, they have to inform the citizens about the activities and especially 
malpractice of political elites. For our comparative study, we generally expect that the better the 
media perform these functions, the higher is their mobilization potential.  
3.1 Mass media as a public forum for diverse opinions 
Media are supposed to contribute to a healthy democracy if they provide a public forum where all 
social groups can articulate and exchange their interests and demands. Voltmer (2000) calls this 
“opinion diversity”. In electoral contests, this is especially important for parties – incumbent and 
competitors – who need space and time to make their political positions publicly known (Ferree et 
al. 2002: 207f.). We argue that the larger the range of ideological positions represented within a 
media system, the more likely it is that every social and political force finds space to articulate its 
demands, and thus, the more likely it is that voters find their preferred vote choice.  
However, opinion diversity can be reached in two ways (Norris 2000; Voltmer 2000). First, internal 
opinion diversity requires that a media system exhibits a high share of politically neutral or 
independent media outlets which are committed to cover the full range of different political 
opinions. Second, external opinion diversity means that there is an even, unbiased ideological 
balance of politically aligned media organizations on the aggregate system level.  
From a theoretical point of view, some scholars think of external opinion diversity as a threat to the 
quality of democracy. They prefer internal opinion diversity because it allows individuals to receive 
a balanced supply of viewpoints by using just one channel of information (Gunther and Mughan 
2000: 423). Others acknowledge that biased media organizations in a system of external opinion 
diversity might provide citizens with helpful guidance for the formation of preferences and also 
better mobilize them (Norris 2000: 28; Voltmer 2000: 11, 45). Because of this ambiguity, we will 
consider both forms of opinion diversity: 
H1a: The higher the share of politically neutral newspapers, the higher an individual’s propensity 
to vote. 
H1b: The better the balance between the political alignments of newspapers, the higher an 
individual’s propensity to vote. 
3.2 Mass media as public watchdogs 
As already mentioned, according to representatives of the media malaise theory, media report too 
negatively about politics in general, and this is assumed to demobilize voters. However, it actually 
is the media’s job to take a critical stance towards political elites. As discussed above, one of the 
media’s normative democratic functions refers to the „duty to inform the public fully about the 
actions taken by governmental elites and experts” (Champlin and Knoedler 2006: 138). Hence, 
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media act as guardians, as a fourth power. They constantly monitor the political office holders by 
making their activities publicly visible (Norris 2000: 28f.). Similarly, Graber (2003: 143) posits that 
media have to „act as a public watchdog that barks loudly when it encounters misbehavior, 
corruption, and abuses of power in the halls of government”. From this perspective, media coverage 
discrediting governing actors is actually desirable and should foster the citizens’ determination to 
retrospectively hold them accountable and vote corrupt officials out of office. We therefore expect 
that: 
H2: The more often political actors and institutions are associated with malpractice in the news, the 
higher an individual’s propensity to vote. 
4 Data and methods 
In this chapter, we discuss the country samples, the measures and datasets used as well as the 
methods applied. 
4.1 Country sample 
In order to test the hypotheses discussed in chapter 3, two different samples of countries are used.  
H1a and H1b are analyzed on the basis of a sample of 33 countries, which were selected according 
to data availability.3 All of these countries can be considered established democracies (Bühlmann, 
Merkel and Wessels 2008). For the analysis of H2 the country sample has to be reduced. This is 
because content analysis data (see chapter 4.3 below) is only available for 15 countries so far. These 
are: Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Switzerland, 
however, is split in two cases, the German and a French speaking part, because the Swiss media 
system is very much segregated along language borders. 
4.2 Main individual-level variables 
The main variables of interest on the individual level are the dependent variable, electoral 
participation, and the independent variables, resources and motivation to vote. These are measured 
by means of survey data. For the European Union member states in our samples, we use the 
European Election Study (EES) 2004. Data for all the other countries is taken from the 5th wave of 
the World Value Survey (WVS, 2004-2008). Because the aim of this paper is to explore the 
influence of newspaper coverage, we limit all our analyses to those survey respondents who 
                                                
3 Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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indicated actually reading a newspaper at least once a week. The exact question wordings of all the 
survey items used and their categories are listed in table A.2 in the appendix. 
4.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable intends to measure whether individuals participate in elections or not. To 
this aim, we use a survey item assessing prospective vote intentions. It asks for the party 
respondents would vote for if there were elections tomorrow. We coded all individuals opting for a 
party or to vote blank or null as voters. All individuals answering “I would not vote”, “none”, 
“refused” (EES only), “no answer” or “do not know” were coded as non-voters.4 Respondents not 
allowed voting and other missings were excluded. 
The choice of this dependent variable requires some justification. There are two main advantages. 
First, analyzing the news coverage just prior to the survey allows us to connect an individual’s 
resources, motivation and willingness to vote with actual, recent media content.5 Second, not 
restricting our analysis to real election periods might help isolate media effects. Some authors 
pointed out that testing media effects in election campaigns is difficult because it is very unclear if 
voters are really influenced by the news reports or the political ads of electoral competitors (Glynn 
et al. 1999: 439). So by looking at off-election periods – or at least not election periods exclusively 
– we can lessen the ‘noise’ coming from other campaign elements. 
We are of course aware of the problem that participation levels as reported in vote intentions might 
be highly biased. As is already the case with the vote recall question, social desirability and the 
greater easiness of simply picking a response category than actually going to the polls could lead to 
overestimated participation rates. A comparison of actual turnout levels and aggregate participation 
rates as indicated by the prospective voting question shows considerable deviations from the mean 
turnout rates between 1995 and 2005. However, these are generally not larger or more frequent than 
with the vote recall question. 
                                                
4 The last few of these categories could be questioned. However, we argue that if individuals did not know which party 
to choose or refused an answer they would probably not go to the polls if there really were elections the following day. 
It is of course possible that those who refused an answer would vote, but simply were reluctant to give away their vote 
choice. However, comparing this category with the question on general party preference in the WVS shows that only 
about half of the individuals giving no answer regarding their prospective participation also refused to indicate a general 
party preference. Moreover, about 80% of the respondents refusing an answer to the dependent variable in the WVS and 
EES had no problem indicating their position on the left-right scale. This suggests that not responding to the prospective 
vote questions is rather related to cluelessness then discomfort with naming his or her preferred party.  
5 Of course, using comparative post-election surveys such as provided by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES) would have been a good option. However, CSES surveys are not yet available as of 2004, the start year of our 
analysis, for all the countries in our samples. 
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4.2.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables on the individual level measure the citizens’ resources and motivation to 
vote. The usual factors in this regard have already been discussed in chapter 3 above. However, the 
inclusion of all these variables into the analyses is not possible due to limited availability of 
comparable survey items across the two different surveys and for all countries. As for individual 
resources, physical capital is measured by income. Human capital consists of education and two 
proxy indicators capturing political sophistication: one is the respondents' ability to place the place 
themselves onto the left-right scale, the other their ability to name the most important problem or 
aim of their country. Finally, the only comparable social capital factors are whether an individual is 
member in a trade union (dummy) and how often he or she attends religious services. 
The most important indicator to account for individuals' motivation to vote is their level of general 
political interest. Second, we include an individual’s frequency of watching or listening to TV and 
radio news. Finally, we try to capture the respondents' satisfaction with the way democracy works 
and with the performance of their governments by two proxy variables asking for trust or 
confidence in the government and in the parliament. 
4.3 Media data 
The media variables are the main factors of interest on the contextual level. As discussed in chapter 
3 we will test both the effects of newspapers’ performance with regard to opinion diversity (H1a 
and H1b) and their watchdog role (H2) on the citizens' propensity to vote. 
4.3.1 H1a and H1b 
To assess the political orientations of newspapers, Schmitt-Beck (2003, 2004) used the average 
political leanings of different media sources as rated by survey respondents and tested how they 
affected the vote choices of their respective recipients. However, since we do not have data on the 
perceived political alignments of media outlets in any of the two surveys, we have chosen a 
different procedure to measure the ideological bias in press systems. Closely based on Voltmer 
(2000), we have created two indicators. The first reflects the aggregate ideological position of a 
country's press system and thus the degree of external opinion diversity. It serves as the independent 
variable for H1b and is constructed by the weighted means of the political affiliations of the most 
important newspapers in a country.6 
                                                
6 The "Political Handbook of the World 2005-2006" (PHW; Banks, Muller and Overstreet 2005) provided the list of the 
most important regional and national newspapers for every country, including their circulation and ideological leaning 
as rated by experts. On the basis of the indicated political affiliations, each newspaper was assigned a Manifesto party 
family code between 1 and 6. 1 to 3 represent the left side of the political spectrum, 4 to 6 the right side. Newspapers 
listed as "independent" were considered neutral and therefore received a value of 3.5. Additional sources were used to 
crosscheck the political ratings in the PHW (Hans-Bredow-Institut (2002); Kelly, Mazzoleni and McQuail (2004); 
Mondo Times (http://www.mondotimes.com/); Østergaard (1992); Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org/); 
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The second indicator, by contrast, reflects internal opinion diversity and will be used as independent 
variable for H1a. It corresponds to the circulation of neutral or politically independent newspapers 
relative to country's total newspaper circulation. Or in other words, the share of newspapers with the 
code 3.5, weighted by circulation and frequency of publication. 
4.3.2 H2 
Data for the independent variables in H2 is taken from a large computer-assisted content analysis of 
the largest newspaper in every country in the reduced sample. More specifically, the paid daily 
newspaper with the highest circulation for which electronically archived copies are available in the 
two most comprehensive newspaper databases (LexisNexis and Factiva) was studied. The time 
frames for the content analyses were the six months preceding the survey in each country. The exact 
time frames and newspapers chosen for each of the 15 countries can be found in table A.1 in the 
appendix. The sampling of articles within these periods of analysis followed an „artificial week” 
approach (Bauer 2000). For every country and media outlet, the Monday of the first week, the 
Tuesday of the second week, the Wednesday of the third week and so on was selected. Saturdays 
and Sundays were excluded, and holidays were replaced by the closest publication day. On the days 
chosen, all articles contained in a newspaper were sampled. 
The final indicators are based on the number of appearances of entities in the news media coverage. 
As entities we denote here the concepts we wanted to extract from the texts, i.e. political actors, 
political institutions or the mentioning of corruption and similar forms of misconducts in office. To 
perform a comprehensive search for our entities, we prepared an extensive ontology of political 
parties7, politicians, and keywords indicating political institutions (the three constitutional powers 
and the public administration) as well as corruption and the like. For every party, we included the 
abbreviation, the full party name, and deviating names of specific party sections (e.g. regionally 
different names). To ensure comparability among countries, the following politicians were 
considered: the head of state, the head of government, ministers, members of parliaments (lower 
chamber) and party presidents.8 
                                                                                                                                                            
Worldpress.org (http://www.worldpress.org/)). Each newspaper code was then multiplied by the respective newspaper's 
circulation so that smaller newspapers receive less weight (non-dailies' circulation was adjusted accordingly). The 
weighted codes were averaged per country and year, and finally their deviance from the neutral value 3.5 was 
calculated. 
7 To assess the relevant parties during the observation period, we relied on data provided by the Social Science 
Research Centre in Berlin and used all parties which gained at least 1% of all votes in the previous election. 
8 The official online services of the respective countries’ governments, parliaments and parties as well as Wikipedia 
provided all information on the relevant politicians. 
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The keywords which match general mentions of political institutions and corruption, finally, were 
obtained in multiple steps. Initially, we compiled a list of keywords from our general knowledge.9 
This original list was extended by synonyms using WordNet (Fellbaum 1998)10 and translated into 
the seven languages in our analyses with the help of various online translation tools.11 Further, we 
added country-specific keywords, e.g. the “Bundestag” in Germany or the “House of Commons” in 
the Britain. In a final step, all keywords were stemmed.12 
When performing a list-based automatic annotation of texts, above all the problem of false positives 
appears, i.e. entities found that do not match the concept supposed to be found.13 To resolve such 
aliases and ambiguities, we additionally implemented heuristic rules. An example of an 
implemented rule is that a politician is only identified if both first name and last name are found 
within the same sentence, or if he or she has already been mentioned within the article. 
Table A.3 in the appendix shows the key numbers of our keyword search as well as the results of 
reliability assessments. Coding errors most likely occur in outlier cases. We therefore assessed 
internal reliability for Mexico, where the highest share of relevant articles was obtained, and the 
German speaking part of Switzerland, which yielded the lowest share of relevant articles. While the 
recall test for the selection of relevant articles and the precision of the entity recognition in 
Switzerland is very satisfying, we had some difficulties to recognize entities in Mexico.14 The 
external reliability test, however, the comparison of the shares of parties in the content analysis with 
their effective electoral strengths, clearly shows that we measure the distribution with high 
accuracy, even in Mexico. 
For the purpose of this paper, four indicators were constructed from the content analyses data to 
analyze H2. They measure how many articles mention representatives of the government, the 
parliament or political parties in general along with the keywords capturing corruption and other 
                                                
9 Examples for such words are “bureaucracy” and “government” for political institutions and “evasion” or “bribe” for 
corruption. 
10 WordNet is a large lexical database of nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, that are grouped into sets of synonyms. 
These sets are interlinked by means of conceptual-semantic and lexical relations. The result is a network of 
meaningfully related words, which can be searched to find semantic synonyms. (Fellbaum 1998). 
11 We employed Leo (http://dict.leo.org; English, German, French, and Italian), Babelfish 
(http://de.babelfish.yahoo.com/; all languages) and the Google translator (http://translate.google.ch/; all languages). 
Since these services often perform very badly, we crosschecked all results using at least two different translation tools, 
in order to minimize the probability of translation errors. 
12 Stemming is a common computational linguistic procedure to extract word stems. Stemmed keywords have the 
advantage that they find similar words and the various flexions of the same word. The stem “legisl”, for instance, 
matches “legislative”, “legislating”, “legislator”, “legislature”, as well as the respective plural forms. The snowball 
project provides acceptable stemmers for all the seven languages (see http://snowball.tartarus.org/). 
13 A good example is the widespread English name “Brown”. On the one hand, such a frequent name can refer to many 
other persons than the targeted Mr. or Ms. “Brown”. On the other hand, “brown” is also an adjective indicating a color. 
14 These problems were mainly due to the high complexity of Mexican names. For example, the difference between 
José Julio Gonzalez Garza and José Gonzalez Morfin is very subtle and difficult to make for automated entity 
recognition, because both politicians have José as main first name and Gonzales as main last name. 
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forms of misconduct in the same paragraph, compared to all articles about these actors and 
institutions. 
4.4 Control variables 
Finally, some more variables are needed to control for well-known effects in participation research, 
both on the individual and the contextual or country level. On the individual level, we control for 
age and gender. Research has often found that people tend to participate more, the older they are 
(Bühlmann 2006: 59; Norris 2000: 262; Teorell, Sum and Tobiasen 2006: 393). As for gender, 
many studies have shown that men tend to vote more often than women (Bühlmann 2006: 60; 
Norris 2002: 139).  
Besides mass media, many institutional and other country-specific characteristics have been 
suggested as determinants of electoral turnout in the participation literature (Blais 2006; Bühlmann 
2006; Lijphart 1997).15 The most decisive institutional determinant according to some authors is the 
existence of compulsory voting within a country (Lijphart 1997: 8; Norris 2000: 263). We only 
count compulsory voting on the national level and if enforced in practice, but regardless of the types 
of sanctions imposed.16 Second, we include the number of parties in the lower legislative chamber 
(Henisz 2006). This is supposed to affect turnout rates, even though the direction of the influence is 
not clear. While a high number of parties offers voters many choices to find the best representatives 
for their preferences, it also increases the likelihood of government coalitions and makes finding the 
right choice more complicated and costly (Blais 2006: 118; Bühlmann 2006: 149f.). Finally, 
because of our special choice of dependent variable, we control for the approximate number of days 
between the survey and a national, parliamentary election. We use the closer of either the last or the 
next general elections. 
4.5 Multi-level method 
The hypotheses will be tested by means of multilevel analysis.17 This method serves to study a 
phenomenon on one level of analysis by taking into account explanatory factors on a higher level of 
analysis (Bühlmann 2006; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). For our purpose, we can explain 
individuals' willingness to participate by their personal characteristics as well as by certain 
attributes of the contexts - in our case countries - they live in. Additionally, it is possible to test so-
called "cross-level interactions" in the multilevel framework (Bühlmann 2006: 273). In other words, 
it can be analyzed how the relationship between and independent and the dependent variable on the 
                                                
15 Their values can be found in table A.3 in the appendix. 
16 Source: International IDEA (http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm) (05.08.2009). 
17 We use MLwiN software. 
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individual level vary across contexts, i.e. according to contextual factors. For this reason, we also 
test whether a good balance of diverse political forces and a high amount of news associating 
governmental actors with malpractice lower the impact of personal resources and motivation on 
voter mobilization. 
5 Results 
We now turn to the results of our analyses. Chapter 5.1 discusses the balance of the press system on 
individual willingness to vote, following the expectations outlined in H1a and H1b. Chapter 5.2 
then turns to the effects of the amount of news reports about misconduct by different political actors 
and institutions on voting propensities in order to test H2. It is important to note that our results 
must be considered preliminary and tentative. To really draw solid conclusions further and more 
detailed examinations as well as robustness checks are needed. 
5.1 The impact of opinion diversity on the likelihood of voting (H1a and H1b) 
In order to analyze H1a and H1b, we use the larger sample of 33 countries and rely on media 
variables which capture an important characteristic of a country’s press system: its degree of 
ideological pluralism or neutrality. Table 1 shows the respective results of a series of multi-level 
regression models. They follow a stepwise procedure. In a first step, an empty model, i.e. a model 
not containing any explanatory variables, is estimated in order to test whether the dependent 
variable varies significantly across contexts. This indicates whether a multi-level model is 
appropriate. Second, the effects of the individual level variables are estimated in model 2. Finally, 
the contextual variables are introduced in the models 3 to 6. 
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Table 1: Multi-level models predicting willingness to vote by ideological bias of press system 
 Empty Model Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
FIXED EFFECTS      
Constant 1.57*** (.19) -.86*** (.29) -1.39*** (.47) -1.71*** (.51) -2.13*** (.56) 
Individual Level      
Income - .17** (.07) .17** (.07) .17** (.07) .17** (.07) 
Education - -.50 (.46) -.50 (.47) -.51 (.47) -.50 (.47) 
Ability naming most 
important problem - .09* (.06) .09* (.06) .09* (.06) .09* (.06) 
Ability of left-right self-
placement - .92*** (.08) .93*** (.08) .93*** (.08) .94*** (.08) 
Union membership - .14** (.06) .14** (.06) .14** (.06) .14** (.06) 
Frequency of church-
going - .26*** (.08) .26*** (.08) .26*** (.08) .26*** (.09) 
Political interest - 1.39*** (.12) 1.40*** (.12) 1.40*** (.12) 1.42*** (.13) 
Watching TV news - .27** (.11) .27** (.11) .27** (.11) .27** (.11) 
Trust in government - .27** (.11) .27** (.11) .27** (.11) .27** (.11) 
Trust in parliament - .77*** (.19) .78*** (.20) .77*** (.20) .78*** (.20) 
Age - .54*** (.18) .54*** (.19) .54*** (.19) .55*** (.19) 
Gender (male) - .12** (.05) .12** (.05) .12** (.05) .12** (.05) 
Contextual Level      
% neutral newspapers - - .62 (.84) .59 (.96) .20 (.83) 
Degree of ideological 
press bias - - .97 (.89) - - 
Right press bias (dummy) - - - .86*** (.32) .85*** (.32) 
Compulsory voting - - - - .36 (.49) 
Number of parties - - - - 1.36 (1.70) 
Days to/since election - - - - .64 (.75) 
RANDOM EFFECTS      
Individual-Level ( 2s ) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 
Contextual Level ( 2 0ms ) 1.11*** (.37) 1.15*** (.38) 1.22*** (.39) 1.08*** (.30) 1.05*** (.33) 
MODEL PROPERTIES      
Number of Cases 
(Countries)  22’621 (33) 22’621 (33) 22’621 (33) 22’621 (33) 22’621 (33) 
Wald-Test (joint chi2); 
(degrees of freedom) 90.27 (1) 568.38 (13) 637.21 (15) 606.21 (15) 697.06 
Notes: Not standardized Logit coefficients; standard errors in brackets. Estimation procedure: RIGLS, 2nd order PQL. 
All variables rescaled to range from 0 to 1, so that coefficients are comparable and indicate the change associated with 
moving from the lowest to the highest value. Cases are weighted by socio-demographic characteristics and sample size 
and only include newspaper readers. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.10. 
 
The empty model shows that the contextual variance of the intercept associated with the dependent 
variable is highly significant. This means that individual voting propensity varies across countries. 
The context is therefore important and estimating a multi-level model is justified. Moving to model 
2, we observe that most of the individual determinants of turnout are significant and have the 
expected effects. The level of individual political interest seems to have by far the largest influence, 
followed by the respondents’ ability to place them onto the left-right axis. Furthermore, the positive 
effects of institutional trust are noteworthy. Apparently, institutional trust serves as a measure for 
external efficacy, strengthening the individuals’ belief that their vote is worthwhile. Following news 
on television or radio also has a positive effect on voting propensity, even though we only look at 
regular newspaper readers. A little surprising is the insignificant coefficient for education. This 
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might be due to the somewhat unconventional measurement of this variable, which equals the age 
when respondents completed their full-time education. Furthermore, the effect of education is 
covered up by the other explanatory variables, mainly political interest and the ability of ideological 
self-placement. 
All these individual-level effects remain stable in model 3, which includes the main contextual 
variables of interest. Turning to the latter, the first coefficient shows that contrary to H1a, a higher 
share of neutral newspapers within a country does not lead to a higher voting probability. Similarly, 
the degree of ideological bias within a press system does not have the negative impact expected in 
H1b. However, this variable simply measures how far a press system departs from complete 
political balance. It does not take into account towards which side of the political spectrum the press 
system is biased. Thus, we also tested whether the direction of the ideological bias matters, by 
recoding the original indicator into a dummy variable. As model 4 shows, this variable has a strong 
significant and positive influence on individual voting propensity. It indicates that the likelihood of 
voting is higher when, on the average, the press leans to the right side compared to when it leans to 
the left side.18 The effect is robust even when controlling for the three control variables on the 
contextual level (model 5). This result is quite puzzling and requires further examination. We will 
thus return to this later on. As for the three control variables, none of them has significant 
coefficients.  
Additionally, we are interested whether media intervene in relationships between individual 
resources or motivation and the likelihood of voting. Since only the press bias dummy variable 
turned out to be significant, we only tested cross-level interactions for model 5 in table 1. 
Table 2: Cross-level interaction effects of right press bias 
Individual-level effect Contextual variance Cross-level interaction a) 
Income -  
Education b) 4.34* (2.42) -1.25 (1.28) 
Ability naming most important problem .01 (.02)  
Ability of left-right self-placement .10 (.07)  
Union membership .02 (.03)  
Frequency of church-going .04 (.05)  
Political interest .24** (.10) -.558** (.23) 
Watching TV news b) .03 (.08)  
Trust in government .15* (.09) -.02 (.21) 
Trust in parliament .72*** (.27) -.02 (.30) 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. a) Not standardized Logit coefficients; b) Figures based on model 4. Estimation 
procedure: RIGLS, 2nd order PQL. Cases are weighted by socio-demographic characteristics and sample size and only 
include newspaper readers. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.10. 
                                                
18 Because of potential multicollinearity with the degree of ideological bias, the impact of this variable is estimated in a 
separate model. 
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Table 2 shows if the slopes of the individual-level effects significantly vary between the different 
countries (column 2) and if these variances can be accounted for by the contextual variable 
measuring whether there is a right press bias or not (column 3). The rest of the coefficients in model 
5 are omitted here because they do not really change when the cross-level interactions are included. 
Apparently, only four of the individual-level effects vary across contexts.19 Moreover, only the 
variation in the impact of political interest can be explained by the contextual variable. Accordingly, 
in a country with an average right press bias the influence of political interest on the likelihood of 
voting is much lower than in left party systems.20 This suggests that especially those groups of 
people who rather tend to abstain from going to the polls rely on the cues that they receive from a 
right media environment. The reason for this result might be that the respective low interested 
individuals who are affected by the direction of the press system are supporters of a specific 
political camp. In order to gain more insight into this puzzle, we thus also estimated to influence of 
all the variables used in table 1 on vote intentions for left and right parties respectively.21 The 
results can be found in table 3. 
For both left and right vote intention we estimated an empty model, a model with only the 
individual-level variables and finally, a model adding the contextual media variables. The 
contextual control variables were not included because they do not necessarily make sense for vote 
choices and because they were not significant in the previous models. First of all, the empty models 
show that the dependent variables vary significantly across the countries, even though only weakly 
so in the case of right vote intentions. Second, about half of the individual explanatory variables are 
significant in the models 2, although not necessarily the same. Trust in the parliament makes voting 
for a left party more probable, while age has a significant effect on right vote intentions. 
Furthermore, the individual coefficients often have different directions, which is actually very 
plausible. It is for example no surprise that union membership reduces the likelihood of voting for a 
right party and has the opposite impact for left vote intentions. 
                                                
19 The contextual variance of income could not be estimated and produced an error message by the software. The 
estimation of the contextual variances of education and TV watching was only possible in the framework of model 4. 
20 This might also explain the interaction between media bias and newspaper exposure just discussed above, since 
newspaper readers can be expected to belong to the group of highly interested citizens. 
21 The operationalization is described in the appendix. There was no information on specific party preferences in South 
Korea. This country was therefore excluded from the analyses in table 3. In order to guarantee comparability, we also 
performed the analyses in table 1 without the cases from South Korea. The results do not change. 
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Table 3: Multi-level models predicting left and right vote intention 
 Left vote intention Right vote intention 
 Empty  
Model 
Model 1 Model 2 Empty 
Model 
Model 1 Model 2 
FIXED EFFECTS       
Constant -.21* (.12) -1.14*** 
(.31) 
-1.47*** 
(.31) 
-.98*** 
(.13) 
-2.28*** 
(.28) 
-2.14*** 
(.39) 
Individual Level       
Income - -.44*** 
(.09) 
-.43*** 
(.09) 
- .60*** (.09) .60*** (.09) 
Education - -.00 (.43) -.01 (.43) - -.55 (.40) -.55 (.40) 
Ability naming most 
important problem 
- .17*** (.05) .17*** (.05) - -.10 (.07) -.10 (.07) 
Ability of left-right self-
placement 
- .60*** (.11) .60*** (.11) - .43*** (.09) .44*** (.09) 
Union membership - .48*** (.07) .48*** (.07) - -.42*** 
(.09) 
-.43*** 
(.09) 
Frequency of church-
going 
- -.55*** 
(.12) 
-.55*** 
(.12) 
- .82*** (.12) .83*** (.12) 
Political interest - .65*** (.05) .65*** (.05) - .29*** (.10) .30*** (.10) 
Watching TV news - .01  
(.12) 
.01  
(.12) 
- .21 (.13) .21 (.13) 
Trust in government - -.20 (.38) -.20 (.38) - .49 (.42) .49 (.42) 
Trust in parliament - .48** (.19) .48** (.19) - .06 (.22) .06 (.22) 
Age - .01 (.19) -.00 (.19) - .39** (.18) .39** (.18) 
Gender (male) - -.10** (.05) -.10** (.05) - .15*** (.05) .15*** (.05) 
Contextual Level       
% neutral newspapers - - -.25 (.43) - - .44 (.75) 
Right press bias (dummy) - - .59*** (.17) - - -.45** (.20) 
RANDOM EFFECTS       
Individual-Level ( 2s ) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 
Contextual Level ( 2 0ms ) .33*** (.09) .33*** (.09) .27*** (.07) .47* (.26) .61* (.33) .59** (.28) 
MODEL PROPERTIES       
Number of Cases 
(Countries)  
21’756 (32) 21’756 (32) 21’756 (32) 21’756 (32) 21’756 (32) 21’756 (32) 
Wald-Test (joint chi2); 
(degrees of freedom) 
10.39 (1) 309.38 (13) 637.82 (15) 35.80 (1) 261.39 (13) 286.93 (15) 
Notes: Not standardized Logit coefficients; standard errors in brackets. Estimation procedure: RIGLS, 2nd order PQL. 
All variables rescaled to range from 0 to 1, so that coefficients are comparable and indicate the change associated with 
moving from the lowest to the highest value. Cases are weighted by socio-demographic characteristics and sample size 
and only include newspaper readers. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.10. 
 
Turning to the contextual model, a very interesting result can be observed, which seems to solve the 
puzzle found in the previous analyses. It indicates that citizens living in a country with a right press 
system have a higher probability of voting for a left party than citizens living in a country with a left 
press system. This corresponds to the effect found for willingness to vote in general. However, 
looking at right vote intentions, the impact of a right press bias is reversed. This was not visible in 
the overall voting analysis, maybe because left supporters are overrepresented in the survey. But the 
finding of opposing effects is quite plausible even though it is not in line with H1b at all. 
Apparently, an ideologically biased press system mobilizes voters from the opposing political camp.  
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Our content analysis data provide further insights why this might be the case. Figure 1 shows that 
newspapers actually favor actors from their own ideological camp in terms of standing. More 
specifically, right actors have a clear advantage in terms of media coverage in right newspapers, 
whereas left actors have a better stance in left newspapers. This suggests that a biased press system 
leads to a prevalence of the corresponding actors, but this astonishingly does not translate into 
increasing participation of the voters of the same camp. 
 
Figure 1: Standing and coverage of misconduct of political actors: frequencies in % 
 
 
The coverage of misconduct, on the other hand, has no influence on the way newspapers report 
about the different ideological camps.22 To assess the coverage of misconduct, we look at how often 
political actors or institutions are associated with words that point to misconduct, such as 
corruption, bribing or scandals. A more critical coverage of the opposite side can thus be excluded 
as explanatory factor, for the result that biased media systems mobilize the voters with the opposite 
ideological orientation. In the next section, however, we will show that coverage of misconduct 
effects participation behavior in a general way beyond ideological differences. 
5.2 The impact of the media’s watchdog role on the likelihood of voting (H2) 
Since we rely on data from the content analysis to test H2, the smaller sample of 16 cases on the 
contextual level is used as of now. This of course means that the results obtained in multi-level 
analyses have to be interpreted very cautiously. Table 4 presents our results concerning the impact 
                                                
22 The finding that right newspapers are „brisker“ is due to the fact that we have more tabloids in the right media 
sample. The non-effect on the coverage of the different ideological camps, however, remains if we control for the 
newspaper type in our sample. 
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of media acting as watchdogs on voting behavior. Because of the low number of cases on the 
contextual level we only include one contextual variable per model in the models 3 to 5.23 
Table 4: Multi-level models predicting willingness to vote by coverage of misconduct  
 Empty 
Model 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
FIXED EFFECTS       
Constant 1.86*** 
(.22) 
-1.16*** 
(.36) 
-.87** (.43) -.88*** 
(.43) 
-.92*** 
(.41) 
-.91*** 
(.44) 
Individual Level       
Income - .09 (.11) .08 (.11) .08 (.11) .08 (.11) .08 (.11) 
Education - .39 (.51) .34 (.51) .34 (.51) .35 (.51) .35 (.51) 
Ability naming most 
important problem - 
.19** (.08) .19** (.07) .19** (.07) .19** (.07) .19** (.07) 
Ability of left-right self-
placement - 
.98*** (.14) .99*** (.14) .99*** (.14) .99*** (.14) .99*** (.14) 
Union membership - .13* (.07) .13* (.07) .13* (.07) .13* (.07) .13* (.07) 
Frequency of church-
going - 
.20** (.08) .20** (.08) .20** (.08) .20** (.08) .20** (.08) 
Political interest - 1.35*** (.22) 
1.35*** 
(.22) 
1.35*** 
(.22) 
1.35*** 
(.22) 
1.35*** 
(.22) 
Watching TV news - .46*** (.14) .46*** (.14) .46*** (.14) .46*** (.14) .46*** (.14) 
Trust in government - .12 (.21) .12 (.21) .12 (.21) .12 (.21) .12 (.21) 
Trust in parliament - .74** (.38) .75** (.38) .75** (.38) .75** (.38) .74** (.38) 
Age - .57*** (.21) .57*** (.21) .57*** (.21) .57*** (.21) .57*** (.21) 
Gender (male) - .12* (.07) .12* (.07) .12* (.07) .12* (.07) .12* (.07) 
Contextual Level       
Misconduct executive -  -.98* (.56) - - - 
Misconduct head of 
state/government  - 
 - -.92* (.48) - - 
Misconduct parliament -  - - -.79* (.44)  
Misconduct parties -  - - - -.77* (.45) 
RANDOM EFFECTS       
Individual-Level ( 2s ) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 
Contextual Level ( 2 0ms ) .77* (.45) .79* (.43) .74** (.37) .74* (.38) .75* (.39) .76* (.41) 
MODEL PROPERTIES       
Number of Cases 
(Countries)  11’802 (16) 11’802 (16) 11’802 (16) 11’802 (16) 11’802 (16) 11’802 (16) 
Wald-Test (joint chi2); 
(degrees of freedom) 72.58 (1) 964.59 (13) 
1’426.28 
(14) 
1’885.39 
(14) 
3’020.78 
(14) 
2’634.43 
(14) 
Notes: Not standardized Logit coefficients; standard errors in brackets. Estimation procedure: RIGLS, 2nd order PQL. 
All variables rescaled to range from 0 to 1, so that coefficients are comparable and indicate the change associated with 
moving from the lowest to the highest value. Cases are weighted by socio-demographic characteristics and sample size 
and only include newspaper readers. *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.10. 
 
The empty model again confirms our assumption that voting probabilities vary across contexts. 
Furthermore, the effects of the individual determinants (model 2) are very similar to those estimated 
for the larger country sample in table 1. These individual effects remain robust throughout the 
contextual models 3 to 5. 
                                                
23 We do not report the effects of the contextual control variables on voting probabilities in table 4 because they are not 
really of interest here. However, we did estimate their impact and found that in the reduced country sample compulsory 
voting as well as the closeness to elections now have positive effects on voting propensity, while the number of parties 
reduces the likelihood of voting. 
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Looking at the contextual effects, we observe that all of the four coefficients have weakly 
significant negative effects. These findings are quite remarkable, and they suggest that citizens are 
actually put off by media coverage accusing political office-holders of malpractice. The more 
frequently media portray political elites critically, the lower is an individual’s propensity to vote. 
However, the results also seem to indicate that the degree of critical media reports only varies 
across newspapers but not across different types of institutions within a newspaper. Furthermore, it 
is not surprising that the effects for the executive and the head of state or of government24 
respectively are the strongest. The government generally is most exposed and watched by the media 
and the public alike. 
To sum it up, our results do not support H2 but rather corroborate the media malaise theory. By 
reporting about the actions of political elites in a critical way, media rather drive people away from 
the polls than helping them to make informed choices and hold the culprits accountable. In addition 
to the simple multi-level models, we analyzed whether there are cross-level interaction effects of 
critical media coverage of the different types of actors or institutions on the relationships between 
the individual variables. In table 5 we only list those contextual variances, which turned out to be 
significant. The pattern is the same for every of the four independent contextual variables which 
again points to the fact that single newspapers report about official misconduct by different actors 
and institutions to similar degrees. 
 
Table 5: Cross-level interaction effects of critical media coverage 
Individual-level effect Contextual variance Cross-level interaction a) 
Political interest by misconduct executive .31** (.15) -.48 (.69) 
Political interest by misconduct head of state/government .32** (.15) -.60 (.70) 
Political interest by misconduct parliament .32** (.15) -.59 (.64) 
Political interest by misconduct parties .32** (.15) -.84 (.76) 
Trust in government by misconduct executive .36** (.15) .21 (.70) 
Trust in government by misconduct head of state/government .34** (.14) -.05 (.71) 
Trust in government by misconduct parliament .35** (.15) .13 (.64) 
Trust in government by misconduct parties .34** (.14) .09 (.72) 
Trust in parliament by misconduct executive .97* (.51) 1.34** (.53) 
Trust in parliament by misconduct head of state/government 1.01* (.52) .86* (.51) 
Trust in parliament by misconduct parliament 1.00* (.52) 1.24** (.55) 
Trust in parliament by misconduct parties 1.03* (.53) 1.04** (.43) 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. a) Not standardized Logit coefficients; Estimation procedure: RIGLS, 2nd order 
PQL. Cases are weighted by socio-demographic characteristics and sample size and only include newspaper readers. 
*** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.10. 
 
Table 5 shows that in every of the models 3 to 6 (table 4) only the effects of political interest, trust 
in the government and trust in the parliament vary across the countries (column 2). But looking at 
the cross-level interaction terms, only the effect of trust in the parliament on the probability of 
                                                
24 We focused on the most powerful office in each country. This for example applies to the Chancellor in Germany, the 
Prime Minister in the United Kingdom and the President in Mexico. 
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voting was found to vary in terms of how often political actors and institutions are being 
scandalized by the media. Quite plausibly, the more political elites are associated with malpractice 
in the media, the higher the likelihood of voting for those who trust the parliament compared to 
those who do not. This interaction effect is actually strongest for compromising media reports about 
the executive and about the parliament. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we set out to explore how press coverage affects electoral participation. More 
specifically, we were interested in the performance of the newspapers with regard to the two 
normative functions that media are supposed to fulfill in a democracy and how this relates to 
individuals’ likelihood of voting in elections. 
First, we argued that media should provide a diverse public forum which gives space to all political 
forces in a society. We assessed this by the average political direction of a press system and 
expected a positive impact of a well-balanced press and individual voting propensities. However, 
this assumption was not confirmed by our data. Instead, we found that if a press system is leans 
towards a specific ideological direction this mobilizes the supporters of the opposing political camp. 
Data from the content analysis showed that newspapers tend to report more about those actors 
which are in line with their political orientation. This might suggest that – because they perceive 
themselves to be on the losing side – left voters feel a stronger need to participate in elections when 
they live under a right press system which gives right parties more standing in the public sphere, 
and vice versa. In a similar vein, the voters of the political camp which profits from the biased 
media system may lack a strong incentive to support their camp if they perceive to be in the 
majority anyway. These, however, are only speculations. 
Second, we stated that media serve as a public watchdog which seeks “to expose official corruption, 
corporate scandals, and government failures” (Norris 2000: 28f.). We assumed that the better the 
press performs this role, and thus the more often political actors and/or institutions are associated 
with malpractice in the news, the higher is the citizens’ desire to vote in order to throw the rascals 
out of office. Again, this expectation did not hold in our analyses. Quite on the contrary, the higher 
the share of critical media coverage, the lower was individual likelihood of voting, regardless of 
which actor or institution was the subject of scrutiny. These rather uniform effects indicate that the 
newspapers we analyzed do not distinguish between different types of actors. For example, if the 
government is often scandalized in a newspaper, so is the parliament. 
In sum, none of our results support the hypotheses formulated in chapter 3. This leads to the general 
conclusion that the normative expectations formulated by democracy theory do not really hold in 
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reality and that the optimistic outlook of mobilization theory can not be upheld in our case. By 
contrast, our results lend support to the media malaise theory, at least with regard to the second 
hypothesis. Obviously, it is not enough to only look at the relationship between media exposure and 
voting behavior as most mobilization theorists do. In fact, if one looks more closely at the media 
content, the story is not so simple. 
However, in concluding we also have to note that we have only provided tentative results in this 
contribution. This paper can be considered a first attempt to gain more insight into the impact of 
media coverage on voters in various countries and to explore the data generated by a large-scale 
content analysis. Accordingly, we are aware of the limitations of our analyses. First and as already 
discussed, our dependent variable is not ideal for really capturing the people’s participation levels 
and choices. Second, estimating multi-level regression models with only 16 cases on the contextual 
level is not sufficient to establish robust results. Third, much more detailed analyses are needed to 
uncover the diverse and complex effects that media coverage seems to have. Finally and most 
importantly, we have only studied one newspaper per country so far. Even though we tried to 
choose the largest newspaper, this does not allow drawing general conclusions about the impact of 
mass media in a country. 
For this reason, we intend to extend the content analysis to include more countries and especially 
more newspapers for every country. The first analyses with our new dataset provided in this paper 
confirmed our conviction that the data generated by computer-assisted content analysis has a lot of 
potential and that this method is therefore worth pursuing in the future. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Country sample 2 including data sources and newspaper characteristics 
Country Year time period Newspaper Rank a) Ideological 
affiliation 
Type 
Australia 2005 May - Oct. 05 Herald-Sun 1 right Tabloid 
Austria 2004 Jan. - June 04 Die Presse 6 right Quality 
Canada 2006 Oct. 05 - March 06 Toronto Star 1 left Quality 
France 2004 Jan. - June 04 Ouest-France 1 right Tabloid 
Germany 2004 Jan. - June  04 Süddeutsche Zeitung 4 left Quality 
Ireland 2004 Jan. - June 04 Irish Independent 1 right Quality 
Italy 2004 Jan. - June 04 Corriere della Sera 1 right Quality 
Mexico 2005 June - Nov. 05 Reforma 6 right Quality 
Netherlands 2004 Jan. - June 04 De Telegraaf 1 right Tabloid 
New Zealand 2004 July - Dec. 04 New Zealand Herald 1 right Quality 
Spain 2004 Jan. - June 04 El País 1 left Quality 
Sweden 2004 Jan. - June 04 Svenska Dagbladet 5 right Quality 
Switzerland (German) 2007 Jan. - June 07 Blick 1 left Tabloid 
Switzerland (French) 2007 Jan. – June 07 24 Heures 1 right Tabloid 
United Kingdom 2004 Jan. - June 04 The Sun 1 right Tabloid 
United States 2006 April - Sept. 06 USA Today 1 right Tabloid 
Notes: a) Rank among top ten paid-for dailies in terms of circulation according to World Press Trends 2005 (WAN). 
 
 
Table A.2: List of survey variables 
Indicator EES items WVS items 
Newspaper 
exposure 
(filter variable) 
 
 
 
V069: And how many days of the 
week do you read a newspaper? 
Scale from 0 (never) to 7 (every day). 
Recoded: “never” à 0; else à 1. 
 
V070 (Sweden only): Do you usually 
read one or several newspapers 
regularly? With regularly I mean at 
least one time a week? 0 = no; 1 = yes. 
V223: For each of the following sources, please indicate 
whether you used it last week (1) or did not use it last 
week (2) to obtain information: daily newspaper. 
Recoded: 1 à 1; 2 à 0. 
(New Zealand constructed from original New Zealand 
WVS dataset) 
Voting V114: And if there was a general 
election tomorrow, which party would 
you vote for? 
Recoded: “none”, “refused”, “would 
not vote” and “d/k, n/a” à 0; else à 1. 
V231: If there were a national election tomorrow, for 
which party on this list would you vote? 
Recoded: “None”, “I would not vote”, “Don’t know” 
and “No answer” à 0; else à 1 
Vote intention 
(left / right) 
Based on V114. Left/right assignment 
according to Manifesto left-right scale 
V231. Left/right assignment according to Manifesto left-
right scale 
Income V230: Income scale (scale of 1 - 5) V253: On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 
indicates the “lowest income decile” and 10 the “highest 
income decile” in your country. We would like to know 
in what group your household is. 
Recoded: 1 and 2 à 1; 3 and 4 à 2; 5 and 6 à 3; 7 and 
8 à 4; 9 and 10 à 5.  
Education V216: How old were you when you 
stopped full-time education? 
V239: At what age did you (or will you) complete your 
full time education, either at school or at an institution of 
higher education?  
(New Zealand imputed from V238) 
Ability naming 
important 
problems/aims 
of country 
V319 / V028: Of those you have 
mentioned what would you say is the 
single most important problem? 
Recoded: “none” and “no response” à 
0; else à 1. 
V69: People sometimes talk about what the aims of this 
country should be for the next ten years. On this card are 
listed some of the goals which different people would 
give top priority. Would you please say which one of 
these you, yourself, consider the most important? 
Recoded: “No answer” and “Don’t know” à 0; else à 
1. 
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Ability of left-
right self-
placement 
V134: In political matters people talk 
of "the left" and "the right". What is 
your position? 10-point scale.  
Recoded: any number on scale à 1; 
“refused” and “d/k, n/a” à 0. 
V114: In political matters, people talk of "the left" and 
"the right." How would you place your views on this 
scale, generally speaking? 10-point scale. 
Recoded: any number on scale à 1; “refused” and “d/k, 
n/a” à 0. 
Trade union 
membership 
V215: Are you yourself a member of a 
trade union or is anyone else in your 
household a member of a trade union? 
Recoded: “yes, I am” and “yes both” 
à 1; else à 0. 
V27: Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary 
organizations. For each one, could you tell me whether 
you are an active member, an inactive member or not a 
member of that type of organization: labor union? 
Recoded: “Active member” and “Inactive member” à 
1; “Don’t belong” à 0. 
Church 
attendance 
V229: How often do you attend 
religious services: several times a week 
(1), once a week (2), a few times a year 
(3), once a year or less (4), or never 
(5)? 
Reversed. 
V186: Apart from weddings and funerals, about how 
often do you attend religious services these days? More 
than once a week (1); Once a week (2); Once a month 
(3); Only on special holy days (4); Once a year (5); Less 
often (6); Never, practically never (7). 
Recoded: 1 à 5; 2 à 4; 3 and 4 à 3; 5 and 6 à 2; 7 à 
1. 
Interest in 
politics 
V154: To what extent would you say 
you are interested in politics?  
Scale from 1 (very) to 4 (not at all) à 
Reversed. 
V95: How interested would you say you are in politics? 
Scale from 1 (Very interested) to 4 (Not at all interested) 
à Reversed. 
Trust/confidence 
in government 
V131: Please tell me on a score of 1-10 
how much you personally trust each of 
the institutions I read out: [country] 
government. Scale from 1 (not trust at 
all) to 10 (complete trust). 
V138: I am going to name a number of organizations. 
For each one, could you tell me how much confidence 
you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (1), 
quite a lot of confidence (2), not very much confidence 
(3) or none at all (4): the government (in your nation’s 
capital)? 
Reversed. 
Trust/confidence 
in parliament 
V129: Please tell me on a score of 1-10 
how much you personally trust each of 
the institutions I read out: [country] 
parliament. Scale from 1 (not trust at 
all) to 10 (complete trust). 
V140: I am going to name a number of organizations. 
For each one, could you tell me how much confidence 
you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (1), 
quite a lot of confidence (2), not very much confidence 
(3) or none at all (4): parliament? 
Reversed. 
Age V218: What year were you born? 
Recoded to reflect age in years. 
V237: This means you are ____ years old. 
Gender V217: Are you … [gender]?  
1 = male; 2 = female.  
Recoded: “male” à 1; “female” à 0. 
V235: Respondent's sex. 1 = male; 2 = female. 
Recoded: “male” à 1; “female” à 0. 
TV exposure V034: Normally, how many days of 
the week do you watch the news on 
television? Scale from 0 (never) to 7 
(every day). 
Recoded: “never” à 0; else à 1. 
V224: For each of the following sources, please indicate 
whether you used it last week (1) or did not use it last 
week (2) to obtain information: news broadcasts on 
radio or TV. 
Recoded: 1 à 1; 2 à 0. 
(New Zealand constructed from original New Zealand 
WVS dataset) 
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Table A.3: Content Analysis: Key Numbers and Reliability 
 
number of 
articles in 
sample 
share of 
relevant 
articles in %1 
article recall 
(Cronbach's 
a)2 
number of 
entity hits 
precision 
entity hits3 
precision of 
party 
recognition 
(Cronbach's 
a)4 
Australia 6'199 29.7  6'197  0.904 
Austria 2'772 47.2  8'617  0.932 
Canada 3'693 43.9  11'166  0.975 
France 10'286 47.6  17'622  0.971 
Germany 5'248 42.2  15'447  0.957 
Ireland 3'760 46.2  8'155  0.945 
Italy 10'233 36.9  19'885  0.865 
Mexico 5'923 61.9 0.913 29'055 79.0 0.977 
Netherlands 3'242 32.3  3'625  0.955 
New Zealand 2'443 47  6'176  0.953 
Spain 5'178 57  25'326  0.997 
Sweden 2'935 34.8  5'324  0.972 
Switzerland (German) 1'904 19 0.895 1'734 95.6 0.973 
Switzerland (French) 5'559 38.5  7'163  0.888 
Britain 9'035 36.3  7'762  0.926 
USA 1'935 39.1  3'745  0.989 
Notes: 1 Articles containing at least one actor or institution; 2 Reliability between automated search and manual control 
of 100 articles in Mexico (country with the highest share of relevant articles) and 100 articles in the German speaking 
part of Switzerland (country with the lowest share of relevant articles); 3 Percentage of correct entity recognition in 100 
Articles in Mexico and Switzerland (German); 4 Correlation of party shares in newspapers and parties vote shares in 
previous election. 
 
